India Reaffirms ‘One-China’ Stance After 17-Year Silence

India has publicly reaffirmed the One-China policy, confirming that it recognizes Taiwan as part of China for the first time since 2008. This statement marks a significant return to explicit support of the policy after nearly two decades of diplomatic ambiguity.  

Why This Matters

 • Diplomatic History: Since recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1950, India had adhered to the One-China policy but gradually shifted to a posture of “strategic ambiguity”—avoiding direct reaffirmation of the principle.   

 • Renewed Clarity: The new statement breaks from that ambiguity, reinforcing India’s alignment with Beijing’s core territorial stance, including the sovereignty claim over Taiwan.  

In Context

 • Taiwan’s Outreach: Over recent years, Taiwan expanded its presence in India, including opening its third Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) in Mumbai in October 2024—an act that drew protests from Beijing.   

 • India–Taiwan Relations: Despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties, India and Taiwan have maintained robust economic, cultural, and techno scientific engagement, often facilitated through representative offices and mutual investment agreements. 

 • Rising Strategic Stakes: As tensions with China have intensified, particularly along the disputed Himalayan border, Beijing has grown increasingly sensitive to any perceived diplomatic outreach between India and Taiwan—even in non-political domains.    

Implications of the Statement

 • Balancing Act: The clear reaffirmation may be an attempt by India to manage its China policy more deliberately, signaling to Beijing that economic and cultural ties with Taiwan won’t cross a red line of sovereignty.

 • Diplomatic Message: This reassertion could help preempt diplomatic friction with China, particularly concerning Taiwan’s increasing international presence.

 • Room for Caution: Analysts will now closely watch whether India’s posture hardens—or if the reaffirmation is purely symbolic, allowing continued unofficial cooperation with Taipei.